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THE CRIME REDUCING EFFECT OF EDUCATION*
Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie and Suncˇica Vujic´
In this article, we study the crime reducing potential of education, presenting causal statistical esti-
mates based upon a law that changed the compulsory school leaving age in England and Wales. We
frame the analysis in a regression-discontinuity setting and uncover significant decreases in property
crime from reductions in the proportion of people with no educational qualifications and increases in
the age of leaving school that resulted from the change in the law. The findings show that improving
education can yield significant social benefits and can be a key policy tool in the drive to reduce crime.
Crime reduction is high on the public policy agenda, not least because of the large
economic and social benefits it brings. Indeed, research on the determinants of crime
points in several directions as to how crime reduction can be facilitated. A relatively
large body of research undertaken by social scientists considers the potential for
expenditures on crime fighting resources (like increased police presence, or new crime
fighting technologies), or on particular policies to combat crime.1 Other work focuses
more on the characteristics of criminals and considers which characteristics are more
connected to higher criminal participation. In this latter case, policies that affect these
characteristics can, if implemented successfully, be used to counter crime.
In this article, we focus on one such characteristic that has received some attention in
the quantitative social science literature on the determinants of crime, namely edu-
cation. In this literature, there is a (relatively small) body of work that attempts to
establish a causal connection between crime and education (most notably the seminal
paper of Lochner and Moretti, 2004) and a vast literature from various social science
disciplines that does not.2 A drawback associated with almost all of this latter work is
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that it is difficult to ascertain whether the direction of causation flows from education
to crime (and not the other way around). This, of course, matters if one wishes to
consider appropriate policy responses to empirical findings.
Our focus is on empirically analysing the crime reducing potential of education and
we present causal statistical evidence based upon a law that changed the compulsory
school leaving age in England and Wales. As the raising of the school leaving age
generated sharp increases in education for those affected, we frame our analysis in a
regression-discontinuity setting looking at birth cohorts just before and after the law
change. We show that there were significant property crime reductions associated with
the extra education people obtained (or were forced to obtain) from the raising of the
school leaving age. The implications of these findings are clear. Not only do they show
that improving the education levels and attainment of individuals who would otherwise
be on themargins of crime participation can act as a key policy tool in the drive to reduce
crime, but also that such educational improvements can yield sizable social benefits.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 offers a brief discussion of the
theoretical background on the relationship between education and crime, describes the
data sources used, shows some descriptive evidence on the association between crime
and education and discusses the school leaving age reform we consider. Section 2
describes the empirical strategies we implement and presents the results, together with
a calculation of the social benefits that follow from the estimated crime reducing effect
of education. Concluding remarks are given in the last Section of the article.
1. Crime Reducing Education Mechanisms, Data and Descriptive Analysis
1.1. Mechanisms Where Education Changes Can Impact on Crime
There are number of theoretical reasons why education may have an effect on crime.
From the existing socio-economic literature there are (at least) three main channels
through which schooling might affect criminal participation: income effects, time
availability and patience or risk aversion. For most crimes, one would expect that these
factors induce a negative effect of schooling on crime, although ultimately this is an
empirical question. We briefly consider each of the three mechanisms in turn:
(i) The income effect works through education increasing the returns to legitimate
work and ⁄or raising the opportunity costs of illegal behaviour (Lochner, 2004;
Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Hjalmarsson, 2008). Empirical evidence supports
the notion: for example, Grogger (1998) links crime to wages, concluding that
youth offending behaviour is responsive to price incentives and that falling real
wages may have been an important factor in rising youth crime during the 1970s
and 1980s. Machin and Meghir (2004) look at cross-area changes in crime and
the low wage labour market in England and Wales. They find that crime fell in
areas where wage growth in the bottom 25th percentile of the distribution was
faster and conclude that improvements in human capital accumulation through
the education system or other means . . . enhancing individual labour market
productivity . . . would be important ingredients in reducing crime.
Conversely, there is also some evidence that education can also increase the
earnings from crime as certain skills acquired in school may be inappropriately
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used for criminal activities. Levitt and Lochner (2001) find that males with
higher scores on mechanical information tests had increased offence rates.
Lochner (2004) also estimates that across cohorts, increases in average educa-
tion are associated with 11% increase in white-collar arrest rates (although this
estimated effect is not statistically significant).
(ii) Time spent in education may also be important for teenagers in terms of lim-
iting the time available for participating in criminal activity. This self-incapaci-
tation effect was documented by Tauchen et al. (1994) who found that time
spent at school (and work) during a year is negatively correlated to the proba-
bility of arrest that year. Hjalmarsson (2008) looked at the opposite relationship,
studying the impact of being arrested and incarcerated before finishing school
on probability of graduating high school. Her results suggest that the number of
times you are caught committing crime and the amount of time spent in prison
both greatly increase the likelihood of becoming a high school dropout.
As these still may be endogenous decisions, Jacob and Lefgren (2003)
instrument days off school with exogenous teacher training days and Luallen
(2006) uses unexpected school closings driven by teacher strikes as an instru-
ment for student absence from school. Both papers find important incapaci-
tation effects of education on criminal participation. However, they also report
that violent offences increase while school is in session, a finding that is
attributed to a concentration effect.3 Anderson (2010) also reports evidence
for US, based on minimum high school dropout ages that vary across states, in
line with the notion that keeping youth in school decreases arrest rates.
(iii) Education may also influence crime through its effect on patience and risk aver-
sion (Lochner and Moretti, 2004). Here, future returns from any activity are
discounted according to ones patience in waiting for them. Thus, individuals with
a lot of patience have low discount rates and value future earnings more highly as
compared to those with high discount rates. Oreopoulos (2007) summarises a
sample of studies from the psychological and neurological literature, concluding
that young people who drop out of school tend to bemyopic andmore focused on
immediate costs from schooling (stress from taking tests, uninteresting curricula,
foregone earnings, etc.), rather than on future gains from an additional year of
schooling. This line of literature also suggests that adolescents lack abstract rea-
soning skills and aremore predisposed to risky behaviour. Education can increase
patience, which reduces the discount rate of future earnings and hence reduces
thepropensity to commit crimes. Educationmay also increase risk aversion that, in
turn, increases the weight given by individuals to a possible punishment and
consequently reduces the likelihood of committing crimes.
1.2. Data Description
There are a number of pertinent data issues that we next need to discuss, as they are
relevant in the context we study. First, there is the issue that crime measurement is
different across data sources. Second, whilst some micro-data on crime does contain
3 This is the geographical proximity of a large number of youths – in the educational establishment – which
may result in increasing the probability of violent encounters.
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information on the characteristics of criminals, the majority does not. In the latter case,
we need some means of matching crime data to education data.
Probably, the most commonly used source of crime datasets in quantitative research
is information on criminal offences recorded by the police. As not all of these are solved
or cleared up, this type of data does not contain information on characteristics of the
individuals committing these recorded offences. Unless these datasets are aggregated to
some geographical level (like police force area) and matched to education data at this
level, then it is not possible to use such datasets to study the empirical relationship
between crime and education. Being realistic, such spatial aggregation does not offer
much hope to credibly study the research question of interest in this article.
The other main form of crime data available comes from those individuals who enter
the criminal justice system after having been apprehended and charged for a crime. In
England and Wales, the Offenders Index Database (OID) contains criminal history
data for offenders convicted of standard list offences from 1963 onwards.4 The data
(which are described in Appendix A, containing a more detailed data description) are
derived from the court appearances system and are updated quarterly. The index was
created purely for research and statistical analysis. Its main purpose is to provide full
criminal history data on a randomly selected sample of offenders.
We have access to OID data on anonymous samples of offenders sentenced during
four weeks each year. We also have the entire pre and post-court appearance history of
these individuals. However, there is no information on a defendants education level in
the OID and so the data needs to be aggregated to connect to education data from
other sources. A big advantage (certainly relative to recorded offences data) is that
some demographic characteristics are available in the OID, notably age and gender.
We therefore calculated offending rates (per 1,000 population) using Office for
National Statistics (ONS) population data by age cohort and year, separately for men
and women. In doing so, criminal offences were also broadly categorised as property
crimes (burglary and theft and handling of stolen goods) and violent crimes (violence
against the person and robbery). These offending rates can be matched to education
data from other micro-data sources where education measures can be collapsed into
age by year (by gender) cells.
We investigated several possible sources of data containing individual education
characteristics to match to the OID. The three main candidates were: the Family
Expenditure Survey (FES); the General Household Survey (GHS); and the Labour
Force Survey (LFS). The best match turned out to be the GHS for several reasons.
First, it enables us to go further back in time, with a start year of 1972 with well-
defined education data, as compared to 1978 in the FES and 1979 (with some missing
years as the original survey was only bi-annual) in the LFS. Starting earlier in the
1970s is important, to ensure we have data on young enough people before and after
the education reform we consider occurred. Second, we can consider two measures of
education – age left school and whether individuals have no educational qualifications –
in the GHS, whereas the FES only has information on age left full-time education and
the LFS contains information on no qualifications (though not consistently in all years)
4 Standard list offences are all indictable or triable offences, plus a few of the more serious summary
offences.
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and age left full-time education. Thirdly, as we are planning to look at the causal impact
via a school leaving age law, the GHS has the more appropriate age left school measure,
whereas the other two data sources relate to school and non-school terminal age. Data
Appendix A describes more fully how we matched the OID and GHS data for the main
analysis in this article. Our sample consists of people aged 18–40 born between 1946
and 1970 from OID and GHS data across the 1972–96 time period.
Other data sources with information on crime activity do permit non-causal analyses to
be undertaken. For example, Census micro-data in a number of countries does contain
information on both incarceration (individuals who are in prison service establishments)
and on individual education levels.5 However, in the UK context, only the 2001 Census
has good enough data on individual education and so only permits a cross-sectional
analysis. The British Crime Survey (BCS) also contains information on the respondents
education level and rudimentary self-reported information on criminal histories.
For purposes of illustration, Table 1 uses these different data sources to show
some non-causal regression estimates of the association between crime and education
for 18- to 40-year-old men and women. Like other studies in the large body of literature
in this area, they show a significant empirical negative correlation between crime and
age left education and a positive association with no qualifications. This is true for the
matched OID–GHS data in the upper panel (except for the no qualifications associa-
tion for women), the 2001 Census data on imprisonment and no qualifications in the
middle panel and the 2001 ⁄2-2007 ⁄8 BCS self-report data on ever being arrested or
ever being in court as the defendant.
Of course, these are simply correlations and are not easy to interpret as there are
many other confounding factors at play. For the case of the cohort models, consider a
simple least squares regression of a measure of offending for a particular age cohort a
in year t (Oat) with an education variable (Eat) as an explanatory variable and
Xjat ( j = 1, 2,. . . , J ) being a set of other control variables:
Oat ¼ a0 þ a1Eat þ
X
J
j¼0kjXjat þ uat ; ð1Þ
where uat is an error term.
If unobserved characteristics of cohorts drive crime participation, but also education,
then least squares estimates of a1 (like those given in Table 1) will be biased. This is a
key issue to the extent that unobserved characteristics affecting schooling decisions
may be correlated with unobservables influencing the decision to engage in crime. For
example, a1 could be estimated to be negative, even if schooling has no causal effect on
crime. This would be the case if individuals who have high criminal returns were likely
to spend most of their time committing crime rather than work, regardless of their
educational background. As long as education does not increase the returns to crime,
these individuals are likely to drop out of further education. As a result, we might
observe a negative correlation between education and crime even though there is no
causal effect between the two. To implement a causal approach that is plausible
requires an instrument for education, which is the issue we turn to next.
5 Indeed, a large part of the US paper by Lochner and Moretti (2004) uses US Census data. Their major
advantage is having several US Censuses where both imprisonment and education data were simultaneously
available.
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1.3. The School Leaving Age Reform
Identification of a causal education impact on crime is generated from a compulsory
school leaving increase that affected 15-year-olds in England and Wales in the early
1970s. Like Lochner and Morettis (2004) approach, which exploits changes in school
leaving age laws across US states, we use the raising of the school leaving from age 15 to
16 that took force in England and Wales in September 1972 (thus affecting the cohort
of children finishing school in 1973) as an instrumental variable in our empirical
analysis.6
Table 1
Example Estimates of Crime-Education Associations
Data Description Crime Education
Men,
aged 18–40
Women,
aged 18–40
Offenders
Index
Database,
England
and Wales
Matched OID
convictions
to GHS education
data by age and
year, 1972–1996*
Log (convictions
per 1,000 population)
No qualifications 0.40 0.04
(0.09) (0.18)
Age left school 0.21 0.19
(0.03) (0.07)
Census 3% individual
sample, 2001y
Imprisonment rate No qualifications 1.61 1.72
(0.06) (0.30)
[0.60] [0.04]
British Crime
Survey
Self-report data,
2001 ⁄ 2-2007 ⁄ 8‡
Ever been arrested No qualifications 0.84 1.13
(0.08) (0.10)
[15.90] [7.30]
Ever been in court
as the accused
No qualifications 0.90 1.01
(0.07) (0.10)
[12.70] [3.90]
Notes. *Population weighted least squares regression coefficients reported (standard errors in round paren-
theses). Sample size is 410 age-year cells for men aged 18–40 and women aged 18–40. Includes GHS control
variables (proportion British born, proportion employed, proportion non-white, proportion living in Lon-
don); ySource. 2001 Census, CAMS (c) Crown copyright. Logit coefficients reported (standard errors in round
parentheses, marginal effects  100 in square parentheses). Sample size is 278,831 men and 212,197 women.
Specifications include a full set of age dummies, 15 country of birth dummies, non-white dummy, 5 marital
status dummies, dummy for never worked, dummies for country of residence; ‡Logit coefficients reported
(standard errors in round parentheses, marginal effects  100 in square parentheses). Based on the pooled
2001 ⁄ 2-2007 ⁄ 8 British Crime Surveys. Sample size for ever been arrested is 6,526 men and 8,073 women.
Sample size for ever been in court as the accused is 9,837 men and 12,252 women. The precise questions
asked are: Have you ever been arrested by the police for any reason? and Have you ever been in court as the
person ACCUSED of committing a crime? Specifications include a full set of age and year dummies. See
Machin et al. (2010) for more details.
6 There was an earlier increase in the compulsory school leaving age from 14 to 15 that took force in April
1947. This and (less frequently) the law we focus on here have been considered in a growing literature in
labour and health economics. Harmon and Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2006) focus on the causal impact
of education on earnings (see also Devereux and Harts (2010) robust criticism of the Oreopoulos paper).
Galindo-Rueda (2003), Chevalier (2004) and Chevalier et al. (2005) look at the effect of parental income on
education of their children. Oreopoulos (2007), Doyle et al. (2007) and Lindeboom et al. (2009) examine the
impact of education on health. We are the first to consider the school leaving age reforms in England and
Wales to study the causal impact of education on crime. Of course, we do not have data on crime for young
enough people before and after the 1947 increase and so can only consider the 1972 law.
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The raising of the school leaving age generates a discontinuity in education measures
at the time when the reform was implemented. In the next Section of the article, we will
show results from empirical analysis of relationships between the law change and crime
and education using instrumental variable (IV) and regression discontinuity (RD)
methods. However, before moving on to this, we first illustrate discontinuities induced
by the reform. Figure 1 uses GHS data to show the average age left school and the
proportion with no educational qualifications for men aged 18–40 who were born
between 1950 and 1965. The vertical line in Figure 1 shows the timing of the law
change. There is a very clear and marked fall in the proportion with no educational
qualifications in the upper Figure and a sharp increase in the average school leaving
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Fig. 1. Education Discontinuities Around the Compulsory School Leaving Age Increase. (a) No
Educational Qualifications; (b) Age Left School
Notes. Based on General Household Survey Data from 1972 to 1996, men aged 18–40. Lines
denote kernel weighted smooth polynomial fit to data points before and after the dis-
continuity denoted by the vertical line. Grey shaded area is 95% confidence interval.
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age in the lower Figure. Evidently there was a big discontinuity in educational outcomes
induced by the law change. The non-overlapping nature of the confidence intervals
before and after the discontinuity in Figure 1 shows that the changes were clearly
statistically significant. Figure 2 also shows a marked fall in the OID conviction rate for
men leaving school after the school leaving reform. There is a very clear and distinct
drop in the conviction rate (defined in Data Appendix A) at the discontinuity, after
which convictions trend upwards. The existence of clear and significant discontinuities
in both crime and education is highly suggestive of a causal impact, the issue and
details of which we next empirically explore.
2. Causal Estimates of the Crime-Education Relation
In this Section of the article, we present IV and RD based estimates of the relationship
between crime and education. We begin with the IV estimates, move next to the RD
estimates, show a series of robustness tests and last present some calculations of the
social benefits of crime reduction induced by improved education.
2.1. Instrumental Variable Estimates
Identification of the causal effect of education on crime is achieved through inclusion
in a first stage education regression of a dummy variable that records the exogenous
change in the minimum school leaving age that occurred in England and Wales, as
described above. We define a dummy variable (SLA) equal to one for individuals who
entered their last compulsory school year in 1972 and later. The discontinuity is
–0.3
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Fig. 2. Crime Discontinuities Around the Compulsory School Leaving Age Increase
Notes. Based on Offenders Index Data from 1972 to 1996, men aged 18–40. Graph shows
residuals from regression of offence rate per 1,000 male population de-trended from a
model containing GHS controls (proportion British born, proportion employed, proportion
non-white and proportion living in London), year and age dummies. Lines denote kernel
weighted smooth polynomial fit to data points before and after the discontinuity denoted
by the vertical line. Grey shaded area is 95% confidence interval.
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generated for the 1957 cohort which was the first to face a minimum school leaving age
of 16 (SLA) when they left school in 1973.7
The relevant crime and education reduced forms are
Oat ¼ b0 þ b1SLAat þ
X
J
j¼0/jXjat þ mat ; ð2Þ
and
Eat ¼ d0 þ d1SLAat þ
X
J
j¼0ujXjat þ tat : ð3Þ
The crime structural form therefore used to yield causal estimates is
Oat ¼ h0 þ h1Eat þ
X
J
j¼0rjXjat þ eat ; ð4Þ
where the IV estimate of the coefficient on the education variable in (4) is the ratio of
the reduced form coefficients in (2) and (3), h1 = b1 ⁄d1.
In this framework, it is important whether the change in compulsory schooling
age legislation acts as a valid instrument. A legitimate instrument for education in
equation (3) is a variable that: significantly explains part of the variation in education;
and is not correlated with the unobservables that are correlated with both offending
and education. Put another way, it is a variable that is a determinant of schooling that
can legitimately be omitted from (1). Our estimates hinge on the notion that SLA
fulfils these requirements. The first issue is a statistical one which, as shown below, is
satisfied as SLA is a strong predictor of education. Regarding the second issue, changes
in compulsory attendance laws have not historically been concerned by problems with
crime. To our knowledge, legislators enacting the laws did not act in response to
concerns with juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment or other factors related to
crime, thus making schooling laws an appropriate instrument.
It also needs to be acknowledged that the variation induced by the instrument is local
in nature, as it has an impact at the bottom of the education distribution and not at the
top. This is because people near the top would have stayed on after the compulsory
school leaving age anyway and the change would not affect them. Therefore, the effect
that our empirical approach estimates is the local average treatment effect (LATE)
among those who alter their treatment status because they react to the instrument. For
this reason, we consider effects separately for the continuous age left school measure,
but also more appropriately for the no qualifications variable.
2.2. Baseline Estimates
The first set of baseline estimates for total conviction rates are given in Table 2. The
Table shows four sets of estimates of the reduced and structural form crime and
education models described in (2)–(4). Columns (1)–(5) respectively show the crime
reduced form, education reduced form and crime structural form for the no qualifi-
cations and age left school variables from the GHS–OID 1972–96 cohort year data for
7 In most years of the GHS we do not know month of birth. Therefore, in a similar way to Devereux and
Hart (2010) in their analysis of the 1947 reform which was introduced in April 1947, where they code their
reform variable equal to 0 for pre-1933 birth cohorts, to 0.75 for the 1933 cohort and 1 to the post-1933
cohorts, we code SLA to 0.33 for the 1957 birth cohort (since the reform began on 1 September, 1972).
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men aged 18–40 who were born between 1946 and 1970. Columns (6)–(10) do the
same but for a sample of ± four birth cohorts around the discontinuity year (i.e. 1957).
Both crime and education reduced forms show a strong and significant effect of the
school leaving age increase. In column (1) there is a 4.7% point fall in the conviction
rate in the years after the education reform, revealing a statistically significant crime
reduced form. In columns (2) and (4), the same is true of education, with a 5.7% fall in
the proportion with no qualifications and an increase of almost a quarter of a year
(0.22) in the average school leaving age.
These significant crime and education effects combine into a significant causal im-
pact of education on crime. Column (3) shows the IV estimate for the no qualifications
variable. It is positive and strongly significant at 0.82. Interestingly this is larger than the
comparable non-causal, least squares estimate of 0.40 reported in the upper panel of
Table 1. A strong crime reduction from education is also seen in the age left school
specification in column (5), where a 10% increase in age left school lowers crime by
2.1%.8 In this case, this is exactly the same as the least squares estimate in Table 1.
The fact that the IV estimates lie at or above comparable least squares estimates
draws an interesting parallel with the literature on the causal effect of education on
earnings where the same pattern seems to occur (Card, 1999). It does not seem
unreasonable to think that the same kind of mechanisms discussed in that literature,
highlighting the fact that the IV estimates pick up a LATE on low education individ-
uals, also apply in interpreting the crime-education results reported here.
2.3. Discontinuity Sample
As Figures 1 and 2 show, there are sharp crime and education discontinuities for cohorts
affected by the school leaving age law. It therefore is natural to focusmore onobservations
nearer to the discontinuity point. The specifications in columns (6)–(10) of Table 2 show
results from focusing in on a window defined as ± four years around the treated birth
cohort at the discontinuity (i.e. those individuals born between 1953 and 1961).
The main substantive change, which is probably not surprising given the narrowing
of the cohort window, is that the estimated reduced form coefficients rise in absolute
magnitude. This is the case in both the crime and education reduced forms such that
the IV estimates remain similar. For the no qualifications and age left school specifi-
cations the IV estimate is strongly significant, identifying a causal crime reducing effect
of education.
2.4. Inverse Distance Weighting
The second way we hone in more on the discontinuity is to note that the policy
treatment induced by the law change is binding for the cohort right near the discon-
tinuity in September 1957. We have thus also generated inverse distance weighted
(IDW) estimates where we place more weight on those observations nearer to the
8 Table B1 in Appendix B shows results for women. The education reduced forms are, if anything, stronger
for women, but the crime reduced forms are imprecisely determined and therefore so is the IV estimate. This
imprecision in estimates is not surprising given the very low female offending rates, especially amongst the
older women in our age 18–40 cohorts, seen in the data.
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discontinuity point and less as they are further away.9 We do this to ensure that
identification predominantly comes from variation close to the discontinuity, weighting
by 1 ⁄d, where d is distance in birth years from the discontinuity.
The IDW results are given in Table 3, which is of the same form as Table 2. The
pattern of results is qualitatively the same as in Table 2 although the coefficient on the
school leaving age dummy variable tends to increase in magnitude (in absolute terms)
in the full sample and in the discontinuity sample. The IDW IV coefficient estimates of
0.88 in the no qualifications specification and of 0.27 in the age left school specifi-
cation show a strong and significant causal impact of education on crime.10
2.5. Estimates by Broad Crime Type
Table 4 shows separate estimates from models of property crime and violent crime for
the discontinuity sample. There are two panels in the Table, the upper panel focusing
on the population weighted models and the lower panel reporting IDW estimates.
There is evidence of a strong and significant crime reducing education effect for
property crime, but the violent crime specifications are much less precisely determined
and the estimated effects are insignificantly different from zero. In the case of property
crimes, the IV estimates suggest that a 1% point fall in the proportion with no edu-
cational qualifications reduces crime by between 0.85 and 1%. A 1% increase in the
average age men leave school generates a 0.26–0.30% fall in their property crime
conviction rate.
2.6. Robustness
In Table 5, we present a number of robustness checks of our main discontinuity sample
results for property crimes. The upper panel of the Table considers robustness to
functional form, for results from the standard regression models and for the IDW
specifications. Four such robustness checks are reported, revealing how the estimates
change on adding birth cohort age specific trends, linear and quadratic birth cohort
variables or linear splines on each side of the discontinuity. In all cases the IV estimates
remain statistically significant and of similar magnitude to the baseline estimates in
Table 4. If anything, the magnitude of the causal estimates increases after these
amendments of functional form.
In the lower panel of Table 5, we also report the results from a simple falsification
exercise which sets a placebo school leaving age law in September 1969. The first
cohort affected would have been the 1954 one and we include all males aged 18–40
9 A similar approach of inverse distance weighting is adopted in a very different context by Gibbons et al.
(2009) in their analysis of housing valuations of school quality where discontinuities arise as children rarely
cross administrative boundaries to attend school.
10 The specifications in Tables 2 and 3 include full sets of age and year dummies. This choice of functional
form is driven by the data matching procedure (see data Appendix A). Adopting a different specification
focusing more on birth cohort, for example as done by including a quartic in birth cohort and age (or age
dummies) in the earnings–education studies of Oreopoulos (2006) or Devereux and Hart (2010), produced
similar results which, if anything, were slightly larger in magnitude. For this latter choice of functional form in
the IDW models, the estimated IV coefficients (standard error) were 0.777 (0.316) and 0.249 (0.092)
respectively in the no qualifications and age left school specifications. Other functional form robustness
checks are reported in Table 5.
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born between 1947 and 1957 (to exclude those affected by the actual school leaving age
increase). We find all the IV estimates to be extremely small in magnitude and none are
even close to being significant. These robustness checks validate the causal nature of
the causal relationship observed despite the potential issues of the rising trends in
crime and education over the years.
2.7. Discussion and Social Benefits Calculation
The empirical analysis identifies a robust, causal impact of education on property
crime. Results on violent crime are more volatile and no clear pattern emerged, pos-
sibly because of the noisier nature of the data, or perhaps (in line with the arguments
discussed in the context of existing literature in Section 1) because the crime reducing
potential of education applies more to property than violent crimes. However, the vast
majority of crimes that occur are property crimes (these represent more than 70% of
offences recorded by the police and indictable offences tried in courts). Given that we
have identified a sizable crime reducing impact of education, it thus seems interesting
to try to say something about the economic importance of such an effect. We have
therefore carried out a simple and, in our view, informative, calculation of the possible
social savings that could result from such reduction in property crime.
Table 6 shows estimates of the social benefits from crime reduction that would
follow from a 1% reduction in the percentage of individuals with no educational
Table 5
Robustness to Functional Form and a Falsification Exercise
Log(OID property convictions personal 1,000 population), matched
to GHS by age and year, 1972–96
Men, aged 18–40,
discontinuity sample,
population weighted
Men, aged 18–40,
discontinuity sample,
inverse distance weighted
No
qualifications
Age left
school
No
qualifications
Age left
school
(a) Functional form
Baseline estimates from Table 4 0.851 0.257 0.999 0.303
(0.370) (0.108) (0.306) (0.087)
Birth cohort specific age trends 0.726 0.212 1.061 0.288
(0.421) (0.120) (0.408) (0.103)
Linear in birth cohort 1.051 0.304 1.200 0.350
(0.511) (0.143) (0.423) (0.115)
Quadratic in birth cohort 1.136 0.315 1.254 0.352
(0.529) (0.140) (0.445) (0.114)
Linear splines 1.034 0.302 1.185 0.350
(0.507) (0.145) (0.419) (0.116)
(b) Placebo SLA increase
Affected cohort 1954,
men aged 18–40,
born 1947–57
0.050 0.027 0.008 0.004
(0.415) (0.222) (0.357) (0.182)
Notes. As for Table 4. The placebo increase in Panel B refers to an imaginary law raising the school leaving
age from 15 to 16 that took force in September 1969, three years before the actual increase.
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qualifications. Using cost of crime estimates from Dubourg et al. (2005) we calculate
that the average cost of a property offence tried in court comes to £1,369 in 2007 ⁄8
prices. The Table 4 IV estimates suggest that a 1% reduction in the population with no
educational qualifications resulted in a 0.851–0.999% fall in property crime convic-
tions. As 91,800 men aged 18 and over were convicted of property offences in 2007 ⁄8,
this translates to between 791 and 917 fewer convictions. Since only 2% of property
crimes committed in 2007 ⁄8 ended up with a court conviction, this corresponds to an
estimated net crime reduction of between 39,525 and 45,836 offences.11 For this scale
of crime reduction, the average social benefits can be calculated as ranging between
£54.1 and £62.7 million.
These are sizable social benefits, especially if one considers that the average cost to
the government for a year of education for a secondary school student in 2007 ⁄8 prices
Table 6
Social Benefits from Decreasing Population with No Educational Qualification by 1%
Causal estimate of SLA change of 1% of population with
no qualification Estimate = 0.851 Estimate = 0.999
Cost in anticipation of crime 174 174
Cost as consequence of crime 787 787
Cost to the criminal justice system 407 407
Total cost per crime 1,369 1,369
Number of male convictions 91,800 91,800
Estimated change in male convictions 791 917
Estimated change in male crimes 4,587,960 4,587,960
Average social benefit from crime reduction 54,103,620 62,741,987
Cost per student of one year of secondary school 4,244 4,244
Number of pupils in education aged 16 493,000 493,000
Cost of 1% increase or extra year of education 20,922,920 20,922,920
Yearly net social benefit from crime reduction
1 year after SLA 13,822,842 12,689,220
3 years after SLA 2,257,534 722,645
5 years after SLA 6,705,272 11,116,482
10 years after SLA 23,260,601 30,315,091
Notes. All costs are inflated to represent 2007 ⁄ 8 real prices using changes in the Consumer Price Index. The
cost of crime estimates are taken from Dubourg et al. (2005). These estimates can be split between three main
channels that are presented in the rows above the total cost per crime. They are based on British Crime Survey
victimisation measures of criminal activity and are all weighted for the probability of an offence leading to
police involvement, a conviction and possible incarceration. The estimated change in male crimes is adjusted
by the number of crimes per conviction (i.e. 1 ⁄ 0.020 = 50). The cost of one year of secondary school per
student is from Goodman and Sibieta (2006). There were almost half a million pupils aged 16 in school in
2007 ⁄ 8. We consider the impact of education on a 1% increase in this stock of pupils to calculate the yearly
net social benefit as the number of individuals treated with the extra year of schooling increases over time. We
do this after 1, 3, 5 and 10 years weighting by the proportion of property crimes by age for each cohorts
affected by the SLA.
11 The best estimates of criminal activity in England and Wales come from annual reported victimisation in
the BCS. The 2007 ⁄ 08 BCS recorded just over 5.8 million property offences. If we assume that men commit a
relatively similar proportion of such crimes as they are convicted for (78%), we can calculate that they are
responsible for just under 4.6 million of the property offences committed that year. It is important to note
that the BCS criminal activity measure is also the basis for the official calculation of cost of crime by Dubourg
et al. (2005) and should therefore be our reference (rather than number of offences recorded by the police)
for this cost–benefit calculation.
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was approximately £4,200 (Goodman and Sibieta, 2006). The cost of making 1% of
those with no qualifications stay on and get some qualification as a result of raising the
school leaving age would be a little over £20 million each year. The yearly net social
benefits from crime reduction would be at first negative as only a few cohorts would be
affected by the policy. However, as can be seen in the last panel of Table 6, this would
be quickly reversed and by the third or fourth year the yearly net social benefits would
become positive. A decade after increasing the school leaving age, the net social ben-
efits would become substantial and reach between £23 and £30 million.12
This cost–benefit calculation should be carefully and cautiously interpreted. For one
thing, it presumes that the 1% who could benefit from staying on and getting some
qualifications can be well targeted. In reality it may prove difficult to identify the right
population and we cannot measure the exact cost of obtaining an educational quali-
fication. Secondly, general equilibrium effects are not factored in. However, these seem
unlikely to significantly offset the large net social benefit estimates the calculation
implies.13 The social savings appear to be quite large over time, confirming that crime
reduction is an extra indirect benefit that can be generated from education policies (as
highlighted by Lochners (forthcoming) review).
3. Conclusions
This article presents new evidence on the crime reducing effect of education, using a
regression discontinuity approach to identify a causal connection. Other than Lochner
and Moretti (2004) for the US and the results reported in this article, evidence on this
is not available. We report empirical findings showing that education reduces property
crime and that improved education can therefore generate social benefits. The esti-
mated social savings from crime reduction implied by our estimates are substantial and,
taking place fairly quickly after the school reform, imply sizable net social benefits from
the additional schooling.
The existence of a causal crime reducing effect of education has potentially
important implications for longer-term efforts aimed at reducing crime. For example,
policies that subsidise schooling and human capital investment have significant
potential to reduce crime in the longer run by increasing skill levels. At the very least,
our results confirm that improving education amongst offenders and potential
offenders should be viewed as a key policy lever that can be used in the drive to combat
crime.
12 Our net social benefit estimate is much smaller than the $1.4 billion put forward by Lochner and Moretti
(2004). The main reason is that we do not identify a clear impact of education on violent crime and especially
murder which account for 80% of their crime savings. When only considering prevented property crimes,
then their estimate is just above $52 million or £35 million (at the average 1.5 £ ⁄ $ exchange rate from 2002)
which falls very close to our lower bound estimate of the social savings of crime. Still, since the population of
England and Wales is more than five times smaller than that of the US, this represents a very substantial social
benefit per capita.
13 One way of thinking about general equilibrium effects would be to consider that the increase in the
proportion of individuals with some qualification could reduce the wages of workers already with this edu-
cation level. Considering the wage effects on crime with an elasticity of 1 as reported in Machin and Meghir
(2004), it could be possible that it would increase the crime participation of the latter group. However, we
believe that this should be more than compensated by the decrease in crimes from the wage premium (esti-
mated at around 40%) experienced by the individuals now obtaining some qualification.
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Appendix A. Data Description
A.1. Offenders Index Database (OID)
Our analysis uses OID data from 1972 to 1996, which we match to General Household Survey
data by age cohort and survey year. The version of the OID to which we have access holds
criminal history data for offenders convicted of standard list offences between 1963 and 2003.
Standard list offences are all indictable or triable either way offences, plus a few of the more
serious summary offences. Standard list class codes are set out in the Offenders Index (OI)
codebook. The data are derived from the Court Appearances system and are updated quarterly.
The data set holds anonymous samples (of about four weeks) for each year from the early
1960s onwards. The selection of offenders is done by analysis of the court appearance data using
the date to select relevant offenders. Selection is based on the following criteria: select offenders
where they appeared in court during the first week in March, the second week in June, the third
week in September and the third week in November.14
The following variables are recorded for each offender: OI Number, Date of Birth, Gender,
Ethnicity, Appearance Date, Court Code, Curfew Orders, Date of Previous Court Appearance,
Age at Appearance, Number of Previous Appearances, Number of Subsequent Appearances,
Police Force Code, Offence Class Code, Offence Sub Class, Proceedings Type, Plea, Disposal 1–4
Code, Disposal 1–4 Amount, Disposal 1–4 Units, Count of Previous Offences and Count of
Subsequent Offences.
Table A1
Offenders Index Database (OID) Descriptives
OID
Year
Age
range
Men,
conviction
Men,
property
Men,
violent
Women,
conviction
Women,
property
Women,
violent
1972 18–25 2.71 2.26 0.45 0.36 0.34 0.02
1973 18–26 2.31 1.85 0.46 0.34 0.31 0.02
1974 18–27 2.57 2.13 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.02
1975 18–28 2.90 2.34 0.56 0.43 0.40 0.03
1976 18–29 2.72 2.13 0.59 0.45 0.41 0.04
1977 18–30 2.62 2.13 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.04
1978 18–31 2.44 1.96 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.03
1979 18–32 2.39 1.83 0.56 0.42 0.38 0.04
1980 18–33 2.49 1.92 0.57 0.42 0.38 0.04
1981 18–34 2.56 2.04 0.52 0.42 0.38 0.03
1982 18–35 3.03 2.45 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.03
1983 18–36 2.84 2.29 0.55 0.47 0.43 0.04
1984 18–37 2.83 2.31 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.03
1985 18–38 2.65 2.16 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.03
1986 18–39 2.29 1.82 0.47 0.39 0.36 0.03
1987 18–40 2.66 2.18 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.03
1988 19–40 2.33 1.83 0.50 0.35 0.32 0.04
1989 20–40 2.01 1.51 0.51 0.34 0.31 0.04
1990 21–40 1.86 1.39 0.47 0.32 0.29 0.04
1991 22–40 1.83 1.42 0.41 0.30 0.28 0.03
1992 23–40 1.67 1.31 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.03
1993 24–40 1.55 1.22 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.02
1994 25–40 1.38 1.08 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.02
1995 26–40 1.19 0.97 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.02
1996 27–40 1.14 0.93 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.02
14 The first week in any calendar month is the week where the Monday is the first Monday in that month.
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Matching OID to ONS population data, we calculated offending rates (per 1,000 population) by
age cohort and year, separately for men and women, using Date of Birth and Gender variables.
Criminaloffenceshavebeenbroadlycategorisedaspropertycrimes(burglaryandtheftandhandling
stolen goods) and violent crimes (violence against the person and robbery), using categorisation
in the Offence Class Code variable.15 The overall conviction rate we use is the sum of the two.
The data structure for men and women, with means of the total conviction rate per 1,000
population, as well as property and violent conviction rates, is presented in Table A1.
A.2. General Household Survey (GHS)
Our analysis uses GHS data from 1972 to 1996. The survey took place on a calendar year basis
from 1972 to 1987, and then moved to financial year. Using month of survey, we matched the
GHS to the OID for England and Wales by age and year on a calendar year basis.
We use two education variables from GHS:
(i) Age left school – variable AGELFTS from 1972 to 1982 and AGELFTSC from 1983 to
1996. Age left school is set to missing if <13 and above 25.
(ii) No educational qualifications – derived from variables measuring highest educational
qualification or whether individuals have any educational qualifications.
Table A2
General Household Survey (GHS) Descriptives
GHS
Year
Age
range
Men, no
qualifications
Men,
age left school
Women, no
qualifications
Women,
age left school
1972 18–26 0.44 15.85 0.50 15.69
1973 18–27 0.36 15.76 0.46 15.69
1974 18–28 0.36 15.76 0.44 15.73
1975 18–29 0.35 15.76 0.45 15.72
1976 18–30 0.34 15.83 0.43 15.76
1977 18–31 0.32 16.00 0.40 15.87
1978 18–32 0.30 16.03 0.40 15.95
1979 18–33 0.32 16.01 0.37 15.97
1980 18–34 0.29 16.08 0.37 16.01
1981 18–35 0.30 16.07 0.37 16.02
1982 18–36 0.29 16.10 0.33 16.04
1983 18–37 0.28 16.10 0.33 16.02
1984 18–38 0.28 16.06 0.34 16.01
1985 18–39 0.28 16.10 0.32 16.03
1986 18–40 0.26 16.06 0.32 16.02
1987 18–40 0.25 16.12 0.29 16.07
1988 18–40 0.21 16.27 0.23 16.22
1989 18–40 0.20 16.28 0.23 16.24
1990 19–40 0.20 16.28 0.24 16.25
1991 20–40 0.20 16.31 0.21 16.26
1992 21–40 0.17 16.34 0.18 16.31
1993 22–40 0.16 16.41 0.18 16.36
1994 23–40 0.14 16.40 0.18 16.37
1995 24–40 0.16 16.37 0.17 16.37
1996 25–40 0.15 16.38 0.17 16.36
15 We do not consider sexual offences since there are very few of them and their relationship with edu-
cation is contrary to that of other crimes (as in the case of rape in Lochner and Moretti, 2004).
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The school leaving age variable was constructed from year of birth as follows. The GHS contains
actual year of birth from 1986 to 1995. In other years, like Devereux and Hart (2010) we coded
year of birth as (year of survey – age) in the July–December survey months and (year of survey –
age – 1) for the January–June survey months. The variable was coded to 0 for birth cohorts before
1957, to 0.33 in 1957 (as the law became binding in September 1972) and to 1 for birth cohorts
from 1958 onwards.
We matched to the OID data by age and year for years 1972–96 for people aged 18–40 born
between 1946 and 1970, eliminating discrepancies between age and year of birth.
The control variables were as follows: proportion employed; proportion living in London;
proportion white; proportion British born.
The data structure for men and women, with means of the two education variables is presented
in Table A2.
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